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Abstract 
Private lands have an important role in the success of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 
The current command-and-control approach to protecting species on private land has 
resulted in disincentives to the landowner, which have decreased the ability of the ESA to 
protect many of our endangered and threatened species. Herein we define and evaluate, 
from an economic perspective, eight incentive mechanisms, including the status quo, for 
protecting species on private land. We highlight the strengths and weakness and compare 
and contrast the incentive mechanisms according to a distinct set of biological, 
landowner, and government criteria. Our discussion indicates that market instruments, 
such as tradable permits or taxes, which have been successful in controlling air pollution, 
are not as effective for habitat protection. Alternatively, voluntary incentive mechanisms 
can be designed such that landowners view habitat as an asset, and are willing 
participants in protecting habitat. The incentive mechanism best suited for conserving 
habitat in a given region depends on many factors, including government funding, land 
values, quantity and quality of habitat, and the regions developmental pressure.         
      
 
 
* Need to put brief biographical note here. Thanks to Institute for Environmental and 
Natural Resources and the Stroock professorship at the University of Wyoming for the 
financial support.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 in the United States exemplifies the private 
lands-public good challenge that arises when the common good is held in private hands. 
The ESA protects species on public and private lands because they have "ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational and scientific value" unaccounted for in the course of 
"economic growth and development".
1
 While thirty years ago this language seemed 
harmless enough, today the ESA is the front line in the conflict between advocates of 
private property rights and activists promoting the common good.
2
 Three factors deepen 
the debate over species protection on private lands. First, most land in the US is privately 
owned.  Second, about half of endangered species rely on this private land for eighty 
percent of their habitat.
3
 Third, some landowners fear that strict regulatory enforcement 
of the ESA may deny property owners valuable uses of their land which rises to the level 
of a Fifth Amendment ―taking‖—private property taken for a public use without just 
compensation.
4
 But the cooperation of private landowners remains critical for the 
preservation of endangered species. The net benefits of the ESA can be increased if an 
amended Act provides economic rewards or if states use economic incentives to reward 
landowners for good stewardship of actual and prospective habitat and species.   
In fact the need to provide incentives for private landowners has been long advocated. 
Aldo Leopold argued that conservation ―ultimately boil[s] down to reward the private 
                                                 
1
 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. s. 1531 (1998). 
2
 The U.S. Congress who passed the Act with little or no opposition—390-12 in the House and 92-0 in the 
Senate.  See Charles Mann and Mark Plummer, Noahs Choice: The Future of Endangered Species (1995). 
3
 S. Polasky, H. Doremus, & B. Rettig, Endangered Species Conservation on Private Land, 15 
Contemporary Economic Policy 66, 66-76 (1997); G. Brown & J. Shogren, Economics of the Endangered 
Species Act, 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 3-18 (1998). 
4
 See Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and Power of Eminent Domain (1985). 
 
 2 
landowner who conserves the public interest‖.5 Many observers agree. They believe that 
endangered species inhabiting private land can be better protected if economic incentives 
encourage landowners to preserve their property. Currently, the ESA provides some 
regulatory incentive for landowners to cooperate with species conservation policy 
through Habitat Conservation Plans
6
 (HCP)—plans that allow a landowner to alter 
habitat under certain management restrictions, Safe Harbor
7
 plans—plans that allow the 
landowner to improve the habitat quality on his land without suffering additional 
uncompensated land-use restrictions, and Candidate Conservation Agreements
8
 (CCA)—
agreements in which a landowner limits future land use restrictions by forging an 
agreement with the Fish and Wildlife Service to protect a species and its habitat prior to 
the listing of the species. But the HCP and Safe Harbors policies provide benefits to 
landowners only after ESA sanctions have been levied against their land. CCA are only 
applicable to a select group, landowners that assign a value to protection of a species 
larger than the lost economic value resulting from voluntary land use restrictions. The 
incentives for landowners to avoid ESA land-use regulations still exist.
9
 Landowners may 
minimize the chances of suffering ESA restrictions by preventing government biologists 
from looking for listed species on private property, or to destroy habitat for listed species, 
or to ―take‖ listed and potentially listed species. These actions may harm listed species, 
destroy or reduce the value of habitat, and increase the costs of designating habitat and 
                                                 
5
 See M. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land:  Four Lessons Learned From the Past 
Quarter Century, 28 Environmental Law Reporter 10701, 10701-10710 (1998). 
6
 See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit 
Processing Handbook (2000). 
7
 See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Safe Harbor Agreements for Private landowners (2002). 
8
 See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances for 
Non-Federal Property Owners (2002). 
9
 See I. Bowles, D. Downes, D. Clark, and M. Guerin-McManus, Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for 
Private Sector Conservation, 8 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 209, 209-243 (1998). 
 
 3 
species recovery. Agencies or private parties can reduce such actions by providing 
incentives for landowners to cooperate through compensation for ―takings,‖ rather than 
through permits or penalties. 
A variety of compensation schemes are possible: direct compensation from the 
government to owners of land taken; tradable rights in habitat, under which those who 
wish to develop land would buy permits from those who would then not be able to 
develop; insurance programs under which landowners are compensated if endangered 
species impose costs on them, like the fund created by Defenders of Wildlife under which 
ranchers are compensated when wolves destroy livestock; or tax breaks to preserve large 
areas of land, rather than to break them up to pay federal estate taxes.
10
 
This paper reviews eight incentive mechanisms from an economics perspective—
zoning, impact fees, subsidies, tradable development rights, conservation banking, fee 
simple acquisition, and conservation easements in the form of either purchased 
development rights or donations for tax relief. Examples exist of nearly all these 
incentives options, both compensated and uncompensated, and none are simple or 
straightforward to implement. We then describe each incentive mechanism and provide 
examples. The following section compares and contrasts each incentive mechanism 
according to a broad set of criteria that addresses perceived biological needs, landowner 
interests, and regulatory concerns. The criteria respect Leopold’s evolutionary-ecological 
land ethic that reflects the scientific notion that nature is not a collection of separate parts 
but an integrated system of actions, reactions, and feedbacks.
11
 This notion focuses on 
defining the natural system within the context of human interaction and well-being. One 
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 Defenders of Wildlife, Conservation in America: State Government Incentive for Habitat Conservation 
(2002). 
11
 Aldo Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (1949). 
 4 
helps promote more understanding by working together to define a set of evaluative 
criteria that reflects a range of ethical views. We grade each incentive mechanisms on a 
five point scale, ranging from very high to very low, for eleven criteria: ability to target 
land specific aspects, permanence, active habitat management, voluntary participation, 
privacy maintained, stewardship recognized, administrative costs, monitoring and 
enforcement costs, acquisition costs, information rents (DWL), and risk of habitat 
destruction. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Incentive Mechanisms 
 We now evaluate eight incentive mechanisms from an economic perspective —
zoning, impact fees, subsidies, tradable development rights, conservation banking, fee 
simple acquisition, and conservation easements in the form of either purchased 
development rights or donations for tax relief. Consider each incentive mechanism.   
   
2.1. Zoning 
As a comparative benchmark to better understand the usefulness of flexible 
economic incentive mechanisms, we first discuss the standard approach to land use 
questions on endangered species—zoning. Local governments, by exercising their police 
power of command and control, influence activities on private property through zoning 
ordinances. These ordinances either specify allowable land uses or they enjoin particular 
activities for specific land regions.
12
 Governments have traditionally used zoning to 
restrict development and other land uses to protect attributes and characteristics of the 
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 United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 341 FW 2, Land Acquisition Planning in Fish and Wildlife 
Service Manual 11, http://www.fws.gov/directives, [cited May 10, 2000], (hereinafter USFWS). 
 5 
environment the government, acting in the interest of the public, deems desirable.
13
 
Governments use zoning to guide development towards existing infrastructure and away 
from environmentally sensitive areas. Zoning has also been engaged to protect scenic 
views, open space, vegetation and tree preservation, and river corridors.
14
  
 
2.2. Impact Fees 
An impact fee is a cash or in-kind payment by a developer to a government as a 
precondition to receive a development permit. Governments often require developers to 
expend resources to create a local public good like a park, as a precondition to receiving 
the necessary permits for development. These expenditures are called exactions, and take 
the form of a cash payment or a land donation, public parks, streets, or other public 
goods.
15
 Regardless of whether the land use exaction is a cash payment or an in-kind 
transfer, the developer assigns a cost to receiving the development permit—the impact 
fee.  
 Impact fees have become popular in the last two decades. The goal of an impact 
fee is to offset the negative consequences of development to the surrounding environment 
and existing infrastructure. Developers pay an impact fee for instance as a condition for 
receiving permits for new projects that would otherwise increase the demand for existing 
public goods and services. The revenues received from impact fees finance the provision 
of new public goods such as parks, recreational facilities, open space acquisition, and to 
                                                 
13
 A. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to 
Weather the Storm, 39 Natural Resources Journal 459, 459-516 (1999). 
14
 Utah Critical Land Conservation Committee, Land Conservation in Utah: Tools, Techniques, and 
Initiatives (1997), http://www.governor.state.ut.us/, (hereinafter UCLCC). 
15
 Alan Altschuler and Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, Regulation for Revenue: The Political Economy of Land 
Use Exactions (1993). 
 
 6 
improve roads and telecommunications.
16
   
 Local governments can also issue bonds as an alternative financial tool to fund the 
acquisition and construction of public goods to satisfy the increase in demand that results 
from new development. The bonds, upon maturity, are typically paid for through the 
community’s general tax fund, which places the burden of funding on all local residents. 
In contrast, impact fees are usually paid when the developer obtains his permit, which 
allows the new public goods to be created before completion of the development project. 
Impact fees have the additional attribute that those creating the new demand for public 
goods pay for that demand, allowing existing residents to maintain a level of public good 
provision by requiring development to ―pays it own way‖.17 
A local government’s right to assess an impact fee on new development rests in 
its regulatory authority, which is authorized by the state. This use of police power by 
local governments has encountered its share of conflict and litigation has resulted in court 
rulings that specify that a ―rational nexus‖ between the impact fee and the development’s 
negative impact on the community must exist. The impact fee must exhibit a direct 
relationship between the externalities caused by the developer’s activities and the purpose 
for which the fees are used to be legal.
18
 Establishing such a cause-and-effect is a 
question of accurately forecasting future demand for a public good, which is always a 
challenge due to the imprecision of economic information.   
 Another alternative to impact fees for mitigating adverse environmental effects of 
new development projects is a performance bond, which are required deposits that 
                                                 
16
 Id. at 15. 
17
 J. Brueckner, Infrastructure financing and urban development: The economics of impact fees, 66 Journal 
of Public Economics 383, 383-407 (1997). 
18
 For further discussion see Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez supra note15; see also Miller supra note 13, at 
459-516. 
 7 
developers’ pay prior to initiating a project to insure that predetermined onsite quality 
levels are met. The developer must pay up-front the costs as they arise, and must oversee 
the project to ensure the quality standards are met. Once the regulator determines that the 
developer has met the contract conditions, the performance bond is refunded.
19
 In 
contrast, impact fees are paid when the developer purchases his permit, are generally not 
refundable, and are used for offsite projects that benefit society as a whole. The 
municipality determines how, where, and for what the impact fees are to be spent, but 
these projects must be reasonably related to the development and be justified by 
communities’ general plan.20  
 
2.3. Subsidy 
Subsidies are financial assistance offered to landowners by regulators. Subsidies 
can be used to create an incentive that encourages landowners to maintain their land in an 
undeveloped state or to mitigate the environmental impact of development by helping the 
landowner meet maintenance and restoration costs of environmentally sensitive areas. 
Subsidies usually take the form of grants, loans, cash payments, or tax allowances that 
are offered by federal, state, or nonprofit organizations.
21
 Subsidy programs are funded 
by numerous methods, including tax revenue, lottery funds, and special permits. We now 
consider four examples to illustrate how subsidies are used in species protection. 
 
Example #1.  Tax Benefits 
California’s Timber Tax Credit (TTC) 
                                                 
19
 Nick Hanley, Jason Shogren, and Ben White, Environmental Economics: In Theory and Practice 58-105 
(1997). 
20
 Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez supra note15. 
21
 Hanley, Shogren and White supra note 19, at 58-105. 
 8 
The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) administer a subsidy 
program, called the ―Timber Tax Credit Program (TTCP).‖ The TTCP induces private 
landowners to undertake conservation projects voluntarily to improve habitat, and the 
probability of survival of the coho and chinook salmon, and the steelhead trout. The 
TTCP provides a tax credit of up to $50,000 to a landowner, upon completion of the 
approved project. Approved projects include the restoration of the stream banks or other 
improvements to the flow of the stream, revegetating the habitat with indigenous plants, 
and performing upland work to reduce sediment runoff and to improve the timing and 
distribution of water returning to the stream. Many projects decrease the speed of the 
flow of the stream and cool the temperature of the water.
22
      
 A landowner who is interested in participating in the TTCP submits an application 
listing the applicant’s personal information, a brief description of the proposed project, an 
estimate of total and qualified project costs, location, directions to the proposed project, 
estimated time frame, type of fish that will likely benefit from the project, and the tax 
credit recipient’s name(s) and I.D. number(s). This tax credit information is accompanied 
by two more pieces of information: a detailed description of the proposed project and a 
detailed estimation of the project costs.   
Upon receipt of the application and attachments, the CDFG determines if the 
proposed project complies with state and federal law. Projects in compliance are given an 
initial onsite inspection, and then can be approved for tax credit. A final inspection of the 
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 California Resources Agency, Department of Fish and Game, Inland Fisheries Division, Timber Tax Fish 
(related) Incentives for Sustainable Habitat (2000), www.dfg.ca.gov/timber/ttcp_2.html, (hereinafter CRA). 
 9 
project completion is conducted within thirty days of completion, and if the project 
satisfies the inspection, a tax credit certificate is issued within 90 days.
23
 
 Tax credits can be up to 10 percent of the estimated qualified costs of the 
proposed project, which are the costs for labor, materials, and in some instance the rental 
rate for heavy equipment. The costs must be incurred for purposes that directly increase 
the survival rate of salmon and steelhead. Costs associated with the installation of water 
pumps, well drilling, permanent roads and buildings, and services rendered by 
professional engineers do not qualify. At the end of the year, the CDFG sums the 
estimated qualified costs for all of the completed approved projects, and then divides 
$500,000 by that summed number to obtain the tax credit percentage, which cannot 
exceed 10 percent. The estimated qualified costs are then multiplied by the tax credit 
percentage and the landowner is issued a tax credit in that amount. This tax credit is 
levied against the net tax, and if not completely used in the year issued, the remaining 
credit can be applied to tax liabilities in future years. The timber tax credit is funded by a 
tax placed on timber sales outside of the United States and receives approximately 
$500,000 a year, which is entirely issued in credits. The costs of administering the 
program are covered by a non-dedicated preservation fund.
24
  
 
Example #2.  Cost Share 
Idaho’s Habitat Improvement Program (HIP) 
Idaho’s Department of Fish and Game (IDFG) is the administrator of the Habitat 
Improvement Program (HIP), which is a cost share program that allocates funds for 
improvements on both private and public lands. The IDFG recognizes the role private 
                                                 
23
 Id. at 22. 
24
 Id. at 22.   
 10 
landowners play in providing habitat for both upland game and wild birds. The primary 
objective of HIP is to encourage private landowners to invest in habitat restoration and 
enhancement projects that increase the populations of wild birds.
25
 The IDFG introduced 
the HIP because changes in the agricultural production practices—both new forms of 
irrigation and more use of marginal land—affected bird populations. 
The IDFG attributes the increased attrition of wild birds, in part, to the farmers’ 
decreased dependence on water canal systems due to new irrigating technologies, such as 
sprinkling systems, which make canals obsolete. As a result, farmers have lined irrigation 
ditches with concrete or removed them completely, thereby eliminating habitat areas that 
provided wild game birds winter homes and nesting areas necessary for reproduction. 
The threat to the population of wild birds is also impacted by farmers who have increased 
their usage of the land, becoming more efficient by employing land that was previously 
idle and often occupied by wild birds.  
Landowners interested in participating in HIP can contact the local office of the 
IDFG, which upon notification makes available a habitat biologist who evaluates the land 
and designs the habitat restoration project so it benefits upland game and wild birds. Not 
all landowner requests are funded. For those projects that are funded, IDFG personnel 
assist the landowner in locating indigenous vegetation and provide other technical 
information. Accepted projects can encompass revegetating or creating riparian areas, 
erecting fences to keep livestock away from wild game habitat, creating water sources, 
establishing windbreaks, or providing wild animals with winter forage. Projects that 
provide a benefit to the local wildlife can be implemented on land parcels of all sizes and 
                                                 
25
 Idaho Department of Game and Fish, Habitat Improvement Program (HIP): Key to the Future for Idaho’s 
Game Birds (2000), www.state.id.us/fishgame/hip.html, (hereinafter IDFG). 
 
 11 
shapes, and in conjunction with other government programs such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP).
26
   
Landowners with accepted projects enter into an agreement with the IDFG that 
documents the project plan and specifies the landowner’s requirement to maintain the 
land, which typically extends for a period greater than ten years. The IDFG reimburses up 
to 75 percent of the landowner’s costs, 37.5 percent for projects on lands enrolled in the 
CRP, with a maximum of $2000 per project. The IDFG encourages, but doesn’t require, 
project participants to allow public access to their land and landowners can leave HIP at 
any time by returning the cost share funding.
27
    
  
Example #3.  Cost Share 
Washington’s Salmon Recovery Funding Board (SRFB) 
 The Salmon Recovery Funding Board (SRFB) administers a program whose 
purpose is to ―support salmon recovery by funding habitat protection and restoration 
projects and related programs and activities that produce sustainable and measurable 
benefits for fish and their habitat.‖ The board consists of ten members, five appointed by 
the Governor of the State of Washington, one of which is a representative of the 
governor’s cabinet. State agency directors from the Department of Ecology, the 
Department of Game and Fish, the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of 
Transportation, and the State Conservation Commission make up the remaining five 
                                                 
26
 Id. At 25. 
27
 Id. At 25. 
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board members. Only the five appointed board members are given the right to vote on the 
procedures and policies associated with obtaining SRFB funding.
28
 
 SRFB funds are made available to private landowners, state agencies, cities, 
counties, conservation districts, special purpose districts, Native American tribes, and 
nonprofit organizations. The funds are obtained through a two-step process. Step one has 
the landowner or other interested party submit its proposed projects to the local lead 
entity, which can be a nonprofit organization, local government, or tribal government, but 
must be agreed upon by the cities, counties, and tribes located within the region the lead 
entity is to serve.   
The requirements the lead entities place upon the applicant vary from region to 
region, and must include several SRFB mandated criteria. The minimum costs of a 
project must be at least $5,000, and the SRFB requires the applicant provide matching 
funds of 15 percent of the requisitioned funds to increase the probability of the project 
being completed. Next, the project proposal should specify the exact location of the 
project, unless the applicant can prove that the project could be located anywhere within 
a specified region.  
And finally, to be eligible for funding, the project must be one of eight types: 1) 
acquisition of land in its entirety or acquisition of a purchased development rights (PDR) 
easement. 2) Improvements to fish migration up and downstream. 3) Screening fish from 
in-stream diversions such as dams or headgates, or creating a fish by-pass. 4) 
Improvements to the habitat below the high water mark, including increasing or 
decreasing the amount of gravel, rocks, wood, and plants in the stream bed, along the 
                                                 
28
 Salmon Recovery Funding Board, Report 18, Policies and Project Selection Grants Manual, Second 
Round, 2000 Cycle (2000), [hereinafter SRFB 18]. 
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stream banks, or in the flood plain. 5) Increasing the quality of the riparian area by 
planting indigenous habitat, removing evasive plants, fencing the area off from livestock, 
repairing stream crossings, or improving the quality of the water supply. 6) 
Improvements to the area outside of the riparian area, or upland, which decrease the 
sediment runoff, provide shade for cooling the water, and affect the time it takes for 
water to reach the stream. 7) Projects that are a combination of any of the above, in 
particular those projects that provide for both the acquisition and restoration of salmon 
habitat. 8) Evaluations, studies, and reports can be funded if they are justified as needed 
to improve the administration of the program.
29
  
Step two requires the lead entities across the state to submit a prioritized list of 
projects to the SRFB. This list is then scrutinized by the SRFB according to the SRFB 
funding policies and a scientific evaluation and assessment of each project. Each project 
must be accompanied by a standard application, which includes general information such 
as the project type, organization type, name, address, phone number of both the 
organization and the contact person, a description of the project, requested funding, how 
the requirement for the matching contribution is to be met, project cost estimates, and a 
biological assessment that addresses species information, habitat factors, necessary 
permits, and measurement information.
30
  
To aid the SRFB in evaluating projects, each project on the list must also answer 
three threshold questions and six evaluation questions. The threshold questions address 
how the project is to be monitored for effectiveness, the long-term plan for managing and 
maintaining the project, and whether the proposed project is already legally required to be 
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 Id. at 28. 
30
  Salmon Recovery Funding Board, Report 18a, Second Round 2000 Salmon Grant Application Forms 
(2000) [hereinafter SRFB 18a]. 
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undertaken. The evaluation questions provide the board with information concerning the 
expected benefit of the project to the survival of salmon, how well the project 
complements other projects or programs for salmon recovery, the scientific basis or 
conservation plan that supports the project, the cost effectiveness of the project, the 
ability of the project coordinator to complete the proposed project, and the reason that the 
project should be undertaken.
31
 
Upon receiving the applications and other relevant information, a technical panel 
of people with experience and expertise in various scientific fields and employees of the 
USFWS and NMFS evaluate the projects. The evaluation specifies whether the project 
has a high benefit to salmon, the level of certainty the project exhibits, and the 
importance of the project on a regional scale. Based upon the evaluation, 
recommendations are presented to the SRFB in the form of a report, which is used in the 
decision making process. Once decisions are made the recipients of funding deal directly 
with the SRFB and the Office of the Interagency Committee for Outdoor Recreation, who 
are responsible for monitoring and enforcing agreements. Funding is provided on a 
reimbursement basis and cannot exceed the requested funding allotment.
32
  
 
Example #4.  Conservation Leasing 
The USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
 The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established when Congress passed 
The Food Security Act of 1985, with its initial goal to reduce the amount of soil erosion 
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32
 SRFB 18 supra note 28.    
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by paying farmers to idle highly erodible lands.
33
 The CRP was reauthorized under The 
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, and the goals of the CRP were 
extended to include environmental concerns and improvements in the quality of water 
along with the previous goal of reducing soil erosion.
34
  
In 1994, the priority placed on environmental considerations increased, and the 
CRP was redirected to enlist land that provided for greater environmental benefits. To 
accomplish the task of increasing the enrollment of environmentally sensitive lands, the 
USDA announced that owners of less sensitive lands—lands not ―devoted to high-
priority conservation practices‖ or lands over 100 feet away from rivers, streams, and 
other bodies of water—were allowed an early release from CRP contracts. Lands that 
opted out were replaced with lands along riverbanks or other riparian areas, or lands that 
served as filter strips. The USDA paid extra for environmentally sensitive lands to 
encourage landowners possessing the more desirable land to enroll.
35
 
The passage of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
confirmed the environmental focus of 1994. Under the 1996 law, the enrollment of CRP 
lands is capped at 36.4 million acres, and the CRP is to be extended through the year 
2002. As of 1996, nearly 33 million acres had been taken out of production as a result of 
CRP enrollment with an average annual subsidy of roughly $50 per acre, and a total cost 
of around $1.8 million per year.
36
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 Environmental Defense, Progress on the Back Forty: An analysis of three incentive-based approaches to 
endangered species conservation on private land (2000), www.edf.org/, [hereinafter EDF]. 
34
 B. Babcock, J. Wu, P. Lakshminarayan, and D. Zilberman, The Economics of a Public Fund for 
Environmental Amenities: A Study of CRP Contracts, 78 American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
961, 961-971 (1996). 
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Sign-Up 16: Environmental Benefits Index, Proposed Rule – Long-Term Policy (1997) [hereinafter FSAc]. 
36
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Landowners or land tenants interested in enrolling their land in the CRP have two 
options. The first option is to wait for a CRP sign-up period, in which an interested 
landowner or tenant submits a bid, which meets certain eligibility criteria, to the local 
Farm Service Agency (FSA). A considered bid must be for land (1) that has been placed 
in productive agricultural use for at least two of the last five years and can legally be used 
for agricultural purposes in future years; or (2) is pasture land enrolled in the Water Bank 
Program or can be planted to trees to serve as a windshield or buffer for a riparian area. If 
the land is cropland, it must be considered to be highly erodible, a wetland, have 
significant environmental benefits restored, be located in a CRP priority region, surround 
uncultivated wetlands, or be likely to experience scour erosion. Furthermore, the 
applicant must have been farming the land for the twelve-months prior to the sign-up 
deadline, unless the applicant acquired the land by deed purchase or inheritance due to 
the death of the prior owner, the land changed hands due to foreclosure procedures or the 
FSA is relatively certain that the land was not acquired with the purpose of exploiting the 
CRP.
37
   
  Upon approval for eligibility, the applicant submits a bid that represents the 
necessary subsidy or lease payment required for the applicant to idle his or her land, 
which for consideration can’t exceed a set maximum rental rate. The applicant also 
includes a description of restoration projects that are undertaken if the land is approved 
for CRP funding, in which a cost-share program that reimburses 50 percent of the 
applicant’s restoration costs if approved plants are established on the CRP land, and up to 
75 percent of the restoration costs if the restoration project is to occur on wetlands.
38
 
                                                 
37
 Id. at 36. 
38
 Id. at 36.  
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Many more applicants apply for CRP funds than the program can accept. 
Decisions on what lands to protect are determined by a formula called the Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI), which orders projects through a point system that assigns points 
according to six environmental characteristics and the projects cost.  The higher the point 
total, the better the chance that the applicant’s land receives funding under the CRP. The 
primary factors are the benefits provided to wildlife (in particular existing or restored 
habitat cover and the significance of the land for listed species), the quality of water, and 
soil protection, each having the potential for 100 points.    
Management and maintenance plans are awarded up to 50 points based on the 
probability the plans are carried out in the long run. The increased air quality that result 
from windbreaks and the resulting decrease in land erosion from wind factors account for 
a maximum of 35 points. The location of the land is valued at most 25 points, with points 
increasing the more significant or higher priority the region is for state and national 
conservation efforts. There is no set maximum point allocation for the cost factor, but 
more points are earned if no cost share dollars are needed, and if the cost per acre is 
below the Maximum Acceptable Rental Rate (MARR).
39
 The MARR is determined 
separately for each county and is based on the soil productivity relative to other counties 
and the local rental value of dryland.
40
 An applicant’s probability of being selected is 
influenced most by planting the cover mixture scored highest, with other significant 
factors being sensitive lands and bidding for a lower subsidy.
41
   
The second option for lands to be entered into the CRP is through the continuous 
sign-up. This option has the same requirements as the periodical sign-up, with the extra 
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requirement that the land has to have a high priority for conservation. To satisfy the high 
priority criterion, the land must be suitable as one of the following: ―Riparian buffers; 
Filter strips; Grass waterways; Shelter belts; Field windbreaks; Living snow fences; 
Contour grass strips; Salt tolerant vegetation; or Shallow water areas for wildlife.‖ The 
applicant is still able to receive 50 percent cost sharing for restoration, and can qualify for 
additional bonuses of 20 percent and 10 percent of the annual rental rate by providing 
various lands and land attributes, and for location in a designated EPA ―wellhead 
protection area.‖ The duration of contracts for both types of sign-ups is 10 to 15 years.42 
A criticism of the CRP and other conservation leasing programs is that the funds 
used to lease the land could have been applied to purchasing conservation easements and 
the land could have been preserved in perpetuity.
43
 A response to this critical view is that 
it is questionable whether one could have secured the same magnitude of land for the 
cost, and that conservation leasing provides the time necessary to obtain funding and 
evaluate projects and apply the government’s limited resources more efficiently. Plus 
conservation leasing provides incentives to landowners to provide and improve habitat 
for endangered species. Some also argue that the compensation that landowners receive 
might change their attitudes toward species—they would now see endangered species as 
an asset rather than a liability.
44
  
      
2.4. Tradable Development Rights (TDR) with Zoning 
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Tradable development rights (TDR) programs specify a predetermined maximum 
level of development within a specified region, and then distribute development rights 
equal to the permissible total amount of development to landowners within the region. 
Landowners who keep their development levels below their allotted development rights 
level can sell their surplus development rights to other landowners, or they can use them 
to offset development on other properties. To ensure that development rights serve their 
purpose as an incentive to change development control to desired social levels, total 
development levels within a given region are limited such that the development rights are 
seen as a scarce resource, which is valuable to developers.
45
   
TDR programs ensure that development occurs on the properties with the highest 
development values, but they do not guarantee that the most environmentally sensitive 
land is left undeveloped.
46
 This non-targeted result can reduce the net benefits to society 
when land has a greater habitat value than development value. If this land is still 
developed under the TDRs, the mechanism has performed poorly. The most common 
approach to overcome this inefficiency is to combine TDRs with zoning.
47
 
Government agencies responsible for land use planning determine which 
properties within a specified region should be protected for their valuable environmental 
characteristics and qualities. They then restrict development of these properties, and 
landowners are provided with development rights to compensate them for the loss of 
economic use. These rights can then be sold to developers in the less restricted properties 
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within the region, where development is more desirable. Those properties that are 
restricted are called sending zones, and development properties are called receiving 
zones. Once sending and receiving zones are determined, the regulator decides on a 
formula for transferring the development rights from one zone to the other. A key feature 
that ensures developers purchase TDRs from sending zones is that the density of 
development in receiving zones, prior to acquisition of TDRs, is restricted to less than the 
demanded density.
48
 The price of a TDR is determined through the open market. To 
facilitate trading and minimize transaction costs, regulators can establish a TDR bank or 
exchange, which brings together willing buyers and sellers such that each can find mutual 
gains through trade.
49
 
Tradable development rights can be complex and administratively cumbersome.   
Establishing this new market involves technical, financial, and legal dimensions that must 
be addressed prior to the actual trading of development rights. These include: (1) TDR 
programs should be established with a ―clear legal authority‖—one way is authorization 
of TDR programs by state law to minimize costly legal challenges and delays in program 
implementation; (2) Ensuring that the program meets its goals requires the employment 
of expert land planners, lawyers, economists, and scientist to perform biological 
assessments, determine the total number and distribution of TDRs, establish a method by 
which development rights are transferred, record such transfers, set the initial zoned 
development density and maximum allowable density after TDRs are purchased, and 
monitor and enforce all transactions; (3) the TDR program has more effective control 
over land uses if authority rest with one agency, and all other methods for obtaining 
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increases in development density are eliminated—the developer has to purchase TDRs to 
increase his or her development density; (4) The objectives of the land-planning agency 
should be clear, concise, and rooted in sound scientific knowledge; (5) The demand for 
development within the region should be significant and impose a significant threat to the 
region’s biodiversity; (6) the regulator should set the supply of TDRs below the demand 
to insure that TDRs are seen as a valuable asset; (7) TDRs should be distributed to 
landowners in a method as fair and administratively simple as possible; and (8) the 
regulatory agency should establish a TDR exchange to reduce the friction within the 
market, which lowers the barriers of bringing together buyers and sellers and increases 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the program.
50
 
TDRs have been used by various states for close to three decades to protect 
historical buildings and landmarks, agricultural and ranch lands, open spaces and view 
corridors, and to protect riparian areas, forests, and other ecologically sensitive lands. 
One of the earliest programs was New York City’s Landmark Preservation Law. The 
program was initiated in the 1970s to protect historical landmarks by restricting 
development of air above historical buildings. The law allows the owner to be 
compensated for the lost right to develop by transferring the development rights for that 
air space to surrounding buildings that are allowed to build beyond the zoned height 
restrictions. New York City also allows development rights to transfer hands via zoning 
lot mergers between adjacent landowners. These landowners can combine their allowed 
floor area without joining ownership of the properties, provided the total floor area 
between the two buildings does not exceed the zoned maximum amount of floor area of 
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the two properties. This system allows a developer to purchase the floor area not in use 
by an adjacent landowner and exceed the zoning restriction by that amount.
51
  
Other TDR programs that have been designed to protect large expanses of 
environmentally sensitive land from the encroachment of development came into 
existence in the early 1980s in New Jersey and Maryland. In New Jersey, the Pinelands 
program encompasses 1.1 million acres of forested expanse, home to several small towns, 
and over 1000 species of plants and animals. The Pinelands have been targeted for 
preservation by the state, which used a TDR program to limit development. Landowners 
whose land is restricted from being developed are issued TDRs, the number of which 
depends upon the preservation value of that owner’s land. The landowner can then sell 
the TDRs to other landowners in the Pinelands region where development is allowed. 
These landowners must possess TDRs to develop their land beyond the predetermined 
housing density. To reduce the transaction costs associated with buyers and sellers 
locating each other, New Jersey established a TDR exchange. This exchange serves as 
the catalyst for transactions between willing buyers and sellers, and determines the 
market price of TDRs.
52
    
Other TDR programs have been authorized by state statute in twenty-two states, 
including six in the west. Kansas and Washington have passed legislation that approves 
the use of TDRs for the purpose of general zoning. In Idaho, TDRs are used to protect 
―designated historic properties.‖ Hawaii has approved use of TDRs for the ―protection, 
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enhancement, preservation, and use of historic properties and burial sites.‖ Arizona TDRs 
are used to protect the ―public health, safety, and general welfare‖ of its citizens. 
Colorado’s TDR programs are to be used for the protection of species, species habitat, 
agricultural and ranching lands, and open spaces.
53
     
       
2.5. Conservation Banking 
Developers undertaking a new project are often required to mitigate the adverse 
effects of their activities, which can be onsite or the developer can purchase development 
credits to satisfy the regulation on land use. Development credits can be purchased as 
needed or the developer can purchase excess credits and bank them to fulfill mitigation 
requirements of future projects. Developers purchase these credits from private or 
publicly owned conservation banks, which determine the prices of the credits based on 
demand and supply. The developer purchases credits if and only if the cost of mitigation 
through credit purchase is less than the costs of alternative approaches to mitigation, such 
as onsite mitigation or establishing a separate conservation bank. If profits are to be made 
by bank owners, other conservation bank owners will be attracted into the market, and 
market competition will lower the price of the credits.
54
 
 The amount of credits that a conservation bank, also called a mitigation bank, can 
sell depends upon the quality and type of habitat, and the number of a specific 
endangered species supported on a specific parcel of land. Bank owners can increase the 
number of credits at their disposal by engaging in land management activities that 
increase either the quality of habitat or the ability of the land to protect endangered 
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species or both. For example in Georgia, the Southlands Mitigation Bank, owned by the 
International Paper Company (IP), is ideal habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker 
(RCW). These woodpeckers build nests in pine trees at least a hundred years old and 
require stands at least thirty years old for the purpose of foraging, of which IP owns 
16,000 acres in the Southlands Forest region. In conjunction with the Environmental 
Defense, International Paper developed an HCP covering 5,300 of the available 16,000 
acres. The HCP established a baseline of two pairs of RCWs, and the HCP had a land 
management plan to meet a goal of increasing the population of RCWs to thirty pairs 
through techniques such as prescribed fire, creating new or restoring existing nesting 
cavities, and relocating young RCWs to the region. As each new pair of RCWs is 
established in the HCP area, International Paper obtains a permit to offset an incidental 
take on its own property or it can sell the credit to a third party within a specified region 
and approved by the FWS.
55
   
Credits can also be determined according to a particular type and quantity of 
habitat. The San Vicente Conservation Bank, for example, is a 320-acre parcel in San 
Diego County, CA. The land cover is primarily coastal sage scrub and southern mixed 
chaparral, and hosts the California gnatcatcher, listed as a threatened species under the 
ESA. The habitat is good quality and requires little in the way of management and 
maintenance. The San Vicente Conservation Bank was approved by the California 
Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) and the USFWS, and was issued 320 credits. 
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These credits can be sold to landowners within San Diego County for multi-species 
mitigation needs and other endangered and threatened species.
56
   
The Manchester Avenue Conservation Bank (MACB) is a similar reserve also 
located in San Diego County, CA, and serves as a corridor for the El Cajon open space. 
The southern maritime chaparral, a unique habitat, is found on the MACB, which because 
of its rarity, the MACB was able to negotiate for credits of one-acre for 1.8-credits as 
compared to the standard ratio of one-acre for one-credit. The MACB is owned by a 
private enterprise that has used many credits to offset its own development, and has sold 
the remainder to other developers in the region.
57
 Owners of banks can be developers, 
environmental entrepreneurs, nonprofit organizations, or government agencies.
58
 Credits 
can be sold to developers to offset mitigation requirements, used to offset the bank 
owners’ own mitigation requirements, banked for future requirements, and sold to 
individuals or organizations that wish to retire the credits thereby reducing development.   
 Conservation banking with the ESA is a relatively recent development, beginning 
in the mid-1990s. The banking scheme closely follows the earlier program of wetlands 
mitigation banking, which has been used since the 1980s. Until 1995, wetland banks were 
primarily owned by state highway departments, and were established to provide credits to 
mitigate for adverse effects to wetlands as regulated by the Clean Water Act (CWA). In 
1995, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Army Corps of Engineers 
established guidelines to create and manage wetlands mitigation banks. These wetland 
banks are designed to provide private landowners certainty regarding assessing land, 
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earning and selling credits, and defining the present and future obligations and 
requirements that a bank owner faces. With these guidelines in place, landowners can 
predict the costs of their present and future regulatory obligations, which decrease the 
risk to the landowner of investing in a wetlands mitigation bank, and results in 
landowners supplying conservation.
59
 
 In 1995, California used conservation banking towards preserving habitat critical 
to reduce the risks to endangered species. By 1998, forty-three conservation banks were 
established. Based on their experience, California instituted a plan based on 14 principles 
for successful implementation of a conservation bank. These principles are: 
 In determining mitigation requirements, priority should be placed on protecting the 
habitat and species in the long run. This is best accomplished off-site and in 
conjunction with a conservation bank. 
 Banks must be established with a legal and enforceable contract or permit. 
 A conservation bank can be of any size as long as it is large enough to support an 
ecosystem approach to conservation. The one exception is when a parcel is one of 
several parts of a contiguous larger bank reasonably certain to be completed. 
 Fee title sale or a conservation easement insuring the land is preserved in perpetuity 
should be recorded on the title of the land in coordination with the first credit sold.   
 Prior to the authorization of a conservation bank, a bank proposal must be approved.  
For approval the bank proposal must include the assignment of a bank manager, a 
description of the banks boundaries and the area for which the credits can be used to 
offset development, management and maintenance requirements including provisions 
                                                 
59
 See EDF supra note 33. 
 27 
for how those requirements will be achieved, and the determination of annual 
reporting responsibilities. 
 A plan that details the resources found within the bank, how those resources are to be 
managed, and how such management is to be funded is required prior to the sale of 
the first credit.  
 An agency should be designated for the long-term management of the bank. 
 A plan should detail the steps to be taken in the event of unsatisfactory performance 
by the bank owner. These steps should ensure the long-term protection of the bank. 
 Monitoring and reporting of management activities centered upon listed species and 
their habitats should be provided. 
 Agencies responsible for ensuring compliance should be granted an easement for the 
right of entry to monitor the agreement. 
 Bank credits should be determined in accordance with the initial, or baseline 
condition. Given the baseline, credits can be earned by preserving the land, enhancing 
the quality or quantity of a habitat or species on the land, restoring the land to its 
original condition, or by creating habitat suitable for species preservation where such 
habitat did not exist prior. 
 The number of bank credits awarded to a bank owner is determined on a case-by-case 
basis, and negotiations are between bank owner and the appropriate regulatory 
agencies.  
 A transaction for credits between a bank owner in one region and a developer in 
another region (out-of-kind mitigation) may be approved on a case-by-case basis. 
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 Listing of conservation banks with the California Resource Agency is required to 
maintain an inventory of banks throughout the state. 
This CA process serves two primary purposes—to increase the certainty about 
present and future obligations of the bank owner; and to ensure that conservation efforts 
meet the goals of the regulatory agency. The process reduces a regulator’s monitoring 
and enforcement costs by requiring the bank to submit both an annual report and a 
contingency plan for bank failure, and by specifying the regulatory agency’s rights to 
enter the property.  
Unlike impact fees, conservation banking compensates landowners for the 
provision of a public good, and does so by allowing the market to determine the 
magnitude of the compensation. Conservation banking differs from TDRs because TDRs 
are an ex-ante approach, in which the proportion of land to be developed is determined 
before development. In contrast, conservation banking is an ex-post mechanism, in which 
landowners establish conservation banks in response to developmental pressures. As 
development increases, the need to purchase credits increases, and the supply of credits 
should increase to meet the higher priced demand. The regulator can determine the 
quantity of land to be conserved by controlling the ratio of credits the developer must 
purchase to offset the development at the time of development, which gives the regulator 
flexibility to meet its conservation goals. 
 
2.6. Fee Simple Acquisition 
Fee simple acquisition is the purchase of land, with all of its inherent property 
rights. Landowners voluntarily enter into an agreement to sell their land, typically at its 
fair market value. Local governments often purchase land for public goods such as 
 29 
playgrounds, nature trails, and other park lands.
60
 Sellers are generally private individuals 
or organizations; land trusts and other nonprofit organizations do purchase land and then 
sell or transfer the land to government agencies.
61
    
One example of a transfer acquisition is Snake Creek Canyon, located on the east 
side of the Wasatch Mountains, UT. A local ski resort planned to develop the area. 
Instead, the ski area sold the land to the Nature Conservancy, acting in the interests of 
several municipalities, a private industry, citizen groups, and a state agency.  This group 
agreed to reimburse the Nature Conservancy for the initial funds to purchase the land. 
The land has had its development rights severed.  The land trust Utah Open Lands holds 
the conservation easement; the Utah State Division of Parks has taken on the 
management of the property. This acquisition demonstrates how agencies and 
organizations can work together to accomplish land use goals.
62
 
Another example of cooperation between government agencies and nonprofit 
organizations is the California Coastal Conservancy (CCC). The CCC offers a wide array 
of programs to protect the California coastline and the valuable resources that are found 
there.  Since its inception in 1976, the CCC has helped protect nearly 33,000 acres of 
wetlands, sand dunes, and farmlands by working with nonprofit land conservation 
organizations through the Nonprofit Organizations Assistance Program (NOAP). NOAP 
provides funding to nonprofit organizations for the purpose of acquiring land or interests 
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in land that satisfy CCC objectives, while the ownership and costs of managing the land 
fall on the shoulders of the nonprofit organization.
63
   
An example is the cooperative effort of the CCC and the Mendocino Land Trust 
(MLT), which purchased two tracts of land bordering the ocean. The first tract, a 74-acre 
beach property located in Caspar, California, has a stream that serves as spawning ground 
for the endangered coho salmon.
64
 The second tract is Navaro Point, a 55-acre expanse of 
coast and open headlands. The purchase price for the two properties was $2.9 million, the 
long-term management of the Navaro Point property is estimated to cost $300,000; the 
Caspar Beach property, which allows for public access, has estimated annual 
maintenance costs of $12,000. MLT is currently raising money for the management of 
Navaro Point and working out an agreement to transfer ownership and maintenance of 
the Caspar property to the California States Park Department.
65
      
 Land trusts and other nonprofit organizations use fee simple acquisition as a tool 
to protect land in ecologically sensitive regions, especially focusing on land threatened by 
urban sprawl. Land trusts originated over one hundred years ago in Massachusetts in 
1891. Local citizens sought to protect their landscape from development. Over the last 
century, land trusts have been used to protect lands ranging from wetlands to ranches, 
from shorelines to farms, virtually all land valued as open space.
66
 Land trusts have 
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increased from 53 in 1950 to over 1,200 today, covering all fifty states.
67
   
Land trusts acquire land by fee-simple acquisition, donation of land with all 
property rights intact, and purchased development rights (PDR) and donated easements.
68
 
Purchasing the land or obtaining the land in its entirety through donation gives the land 
trust more control over land uses. The price of this control is the costs to manage the 
land, which often require significant staff and resources. Land trusts try to reduce 
management costs by serving as a broker or middleman between the landowner and a 
larger trust or government agency. Land trusts also avoid management costs by acquiring 
a conservation easement, purchased development rights (PDR) or donated, which allows 
the landowner to remain on the land and maintain the land according to the terms of the 
easement. The land trust is still responsible for monitoring and enforcing the terms of the 
easement.   
While enforcement costs have been relatively low to date, land trusts expect them 
to escalate as easement-encumbered land passes from the initial landowner to subsequent 
landowners. Trusts set aside funds now to enforce easements in the future. More than 90 
percent of easement-encumbered land remains with the landowner who signed the 
contract.
69
 
 Currently in the western US, about 250 land trusts exist to protect over a million 
acres. Land previously held in private ownership is now solely owned by land trusts or in 
joint ownership between private landowners and land trusts.
70
 Every western state has at 
least one land trust, in which the number is correlated with the pressure to develop. For 
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example, in 1998, California had 119 land trusts protecting 536,922 acres, and Texas 
protected 11,531 acres with 20 land trusts.
71
 
 A recent trend is the move to more specialization and smaller land trusts. These 
smaller trusts have clearer ties to the local community, and are finding they can best use their 
resources by working with landowners, by arbitraging the land or by facilitating trades. 
Smaller land trusts have fewer resources and are less able to acquire easements and monitor 
and enforce agreements. 
 
2.7. Conservation Easement 
 Ownership of land provides the landowner certain rights regarding how the land 
can be used, which include the right to exclude others from using the land, the right to 
develop the land, the right to produce commodities, and the right to employ other legal 
rent-seeking activities. A conventional easement is a legal instrument that serves to 
separate specific rights in the land and transfer those rights from the landowner to another 
entity.
72 
 A conservation easement serves the same purpose, except that species and 
habitat protection is the explicit goal. 
A conventional easement is generally negotiated between adjacent landowners 
where both landowners benefit from the agreement. Coase depicted the concept of an 
easement in his seminal article The Problems of Social Cost.
73
 Coase addressed how 
bargaining rather than government taxation could remove the social cost caused by a 
rancher’s cattle trampling a neighbor’s crops on their way to a watering hole. Coase 
argued that the rancher and the farmer could both increase their well-being, assuming the 
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farmer holds the property rights and transaction costs are low. If the farmer would accept 
a payment from the rancher in exchange for the right—the easement—for the rancher’s 
cattle to cross the farmers land.   
 Conventional easements are typically affirmative and appurtenant. Affirmative 
means that the easement holder is given the right to conduct specified activities, such as a 
right-of-way. Appurtenant means that the benefits provided by the easement belong to 
and are typically realized only by the easement holder.
74
 Such easements have been used 
to transfer partial interests in land for thousands of years.    
 Like conventional easements, a conservation easement severs some of the 
interests in the land and transfers those interests to another party. In contrast to a 
conventional easement, a conservation easement tends to be negative and in gross. Here 
negative means that rather than allowing the holder of the easement to engage in 
specified activities, the holder of the easement can restrict the landowner from engaging 
in specified activities; in gross means that the easement holder can be someone other than 
an adjacent landowner. A conservation easement prohibits the landowner from specified 
uses on his or her land.
75
   
 Conservation easements are voluntary contracts between a landowner and the 
government agency or nonprofit organization, in which contracts are negotiated on a 
property-by-property basis and can be tailored to satisfy individual landowner 
requirements while maintaining conservation objectives. These contracts typically 
include a description of the conservation goals for the property, an initial appraisal of the 
land, acceptable land uses and restrictions on land uses, the landowner’s management 
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responsibilities, the conservator’s right to access the land, proof of unencumbered 
ownership, legal requirements in the event of a contract breach, provisions regarding 
present and future liabilities, and the landowner’s requirement of notification when the 
property is sold.
76
 Contracts also specify duration of the easement as well as 
compensation to the landowner.   
To illustrate, consider a rancher whose land borders Yellowstone Park in Montana 
and offers excellent habitat for the grizzly bear, a species listed as threatened by the 
FWS. Suppose this rancher is approached by a nonprofit conservation organization (in 
Montana, only state and federal agencies or nonprofit organizations that are qualified by 
the IRS are allowed to own a conservation easement), and the terms of a conservation 
easement are negotiated. A contract between the rancher and the nonprofit organization is 
created, in which the rancher agrees to refrain from developing any portion of his land, 
and further agrees to limit or discontinue grazing on portions of the land deemed to be 
valuable and sensitive to grazing. In return, the rancher receives payment for his 
conservation efforts. The land conserved increases the recovery likelihood and, it is 
hoped, the eventual delisting of the grizzly bear. The conservation easement provides 
society benefits from the conservation of the land. Possession of the development rights 
does not give the holder the right to develop the land; in contrast it gives the holder the 
right to, and the obligation of, restricting development of the land. 
 In general, conservation easements are classified into two broad categories—
purchased development rights (PDR) easement and donated easements. The type of 
sellers, the type of buyers, the mode of compensation, and the duration of the contract 
characterize the difference between the two easements. A PDR easement is typically 
                                                 
76
 See Boyd supra note 46.  
 35 
entered into by profit-maximizing landowners who require full compensation for their 
forgone opportunity, the land’s development value. The purchaser of a PDR easement is 
often a government agency, which generally has a larger coffer than most nonprofit 
organizations and is better able to finance the purchase of the easement. The payment for 
a PDR easement is typically a one-time lump sum payment and PDR easements can be 
purchased for limited time periods or in perpetuity.   
The donated easement is based on a tax incentive, which typically appeals to 
landowners who value the preservation of land and are willing to be compensated at less than 
fair market value for the easement. Federal tax law requires that land must be donated to a 
nonprofit conservation organization and donated in perpetuity to qualify for tax incentives.
77
 
Tax incentives can take the form of a deduction in income taxes, a reduction in the base value 
for estate or gift taxes, and, if the conservation easement meets certain requirements, an 
additional reduction in the estate tax base. Consider each type of easement in turn. 
 
2.7.1. PDR Easements 
 
 A PDR easement is a conservation mechanism in which the landowner sells the 
conservation-incompatible uses of the land for a specified period of time for a cash 
payment, usually at the fair market value of the easement—the difference between the 
easement-free value and the easement-encumbered value of the property. Determining 
just compensation is complicated because no easement market exists (that is no 
comparables), and the value of the land unencumbered is uncertain and likely to change 
as the developmental pressure it faces changes.
78
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2.7.2. Donated Easements 
The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) offers tax incentives to landowners who 
donate in perpetuity the development interests in their land for conservation purposes to a 
qualified nonprofit organization or government agency. The IRS requires the donated 
easement be for land that provides society with a valued public good and the recipient 
must be pre-approved by the IRS as tax-exempt and eligible to receive donations used for 
tax considerations.  
Qualifying lands must satisfy one of the following conservation purposes: The 
conserved land must (1) provide education or outdoor recreation to society; (2) provide 
protection to species by conserving their natural habitat or ecosystem; (3) provide society 
a scenic vista by preserving open spaces; or (4) provide for the protection of historically 
significant lands and buildings. Easements are donated to an organization established for 
conservation purposes, which can monitor and enforce the terms of the easement, and can 
only be resold or transferred to a similar agency.
79
 
Landowners may receive relief from income tax, gift tax, and estate tax by 
donating a conservation easement. The deductions provided by a conservation easement 
to the heirs of an estate are two fold. First, the value of the estate is reduced by the fair 
market value of the easement. Second, the tax base of the estate may qualify for an 
additional 40 percent reduction in value up to the exclusion limit, when the land has 
significant conservation value such that the easement reduces the value of the land by at 
least thirty percent and the percentage reduction decreases as the value of the easement 
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decreases in proportion to the total value of the land. The exclusion limit for deaths 
occurring in the year 2000 is $300,000 and increases to $500,000 for the year 2002 and 
thereafter. To qualify for the additional tax deduction for high conservation value the land 
must satisfy certain ownership requirements and must be within twenty-five miles of an 
Office of Management and Budget designated metropolitan statistical area or a federal 
wilderness area or lie within ten miles of an Urban National Forest.
80
 Of course, the on-
going debate in Congress over taxes policy could change these conditions over the next 
few years. 
These two incentives can be the difference between an estate being maintained in 
one contiguous area or being broken up and sold to meet estate tax liability. Estates that 
are valued less than $675,000 have an estate tax liability of zero. For example, suppose 
an estate is valued at $1,500,000, and a landowner or heir donates a conservation 
easement, to a qualified nonprofit organization, which is valued at $500,000. The estate 
also benefits from a $400,000 deduction due to the high conservation quality of the land. 
The estate tax would be levied on an estate valued at $600,000, and the heirs would 
escape any estate tax liability as a result of the donation.
81
   
Donated easements may also reduce landowners’ income tax liability. A 
landowner who donates a conservation easement to a qualified agency can deduct the 
entire value of the easement from his income tax provided it does not exceed 30 percent 
of his adjusted gross income. If the easement value exceeds this 30 percent threshold, the 
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landowner can deduct 30 percent of his adjusted gross income for up to six years or until 
he has exhausted the easement value. The value of the easement is measured as the 
difference in the land’s value with and without the easement.82 
 
3. Incentive Mechanisms: Compare and Contrast 
A US Senator once said in private conversation that ―if we pay landowners to grow 
endangered species, we will have more than we know what to do with.‖ The question is 
how to do this in the most cost-effective manner such that biological needs are met, 
landowner concerns are addressed, and government budgets are solvent. In this section 
we evaluate each economic incentives based on three broad criteria: 1) biological-land 
targets; 2) landowner interests; and 3) government or regulatory concerns. The incentive 
mechanisms are rated on a five-point scale—very high, high, medium, low, or very low, 
according to how well the incentive mechanism satisfies each criterion. Table 1 
summarizes our discussion of the mechanisms and criteria.    
 
3.1. Biological-Needs 
 We consider three policy-orientated biological-needs aimed at retiring and 
enhancing habitat on private property that shelters endangered species; first is the ability 
for a mechanism to target specific characteristics of the land—whether it be creating one 
large preserve with minimal edge, preserving a specific type of vegetation or key species, 
or preserving several small preserves for meta-population management; second, the likely 
permanence of the protected habitat; and third, the ability of the mechanism to implement 
active habitat management techniques. We follow Terborgh’s observation that ―logic 
calls for a strategy that minimizes extinctions, and this is best accomplished with large 
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preserves.‖83 Biologists seem to agree with the view that habitat requirements are species 
specific, and species that are more land sensitive need larger habitat remnants for 
survival.
84
 Fragmentation increases the risk to species when it alters the microclimate of 
the habitat and when each fragment remains isolated. We make the presumption that 
biologists have identified and targeted the private land most suitable to guarantee the safe 
minimum standard, or maximum viable population, or minimum acceptable probability 
of survival. We then use the likelihood of satisfying species-specific habitat 
requirements, which is accomplished through targeting specific land characteristics, 
compelling landowners to undertake active habitat management, and the probability the 
habitat reserve is retired and protected permanently as the proxies for the basic biology at 
work behind these land use decisions.    
 
3.1.1. Odds of Targeting Habitat Characteristics: Species Specific Requirements 
Most scientists agree that habitat requirements are species specific, and species 
that are more land sensitive need larger habitat remnants for survival.
85
 Unfortunately, for 
most listed species, habitat destruction has reduced the amount of remaining habitat to a 
level below that necessary for the species survival. In most cases, the remaining habitat is 
fragmented in several smaller reserves. And although some species thrive on the edges 
between habitats, biologists believe most endangered species do not. New evidence has 
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overtaken the Leopold ``law of interspersion''—more edge, more population density—
with the proposition that edge effects cause extinction.
86
 Edge effects arise from nest 
paratism and the penetration of light and wind into the habitat. Species move away from 
the edge and further into a forest causing a reduction in total area and lower population 
persistence.
87
 
For other endangered and threatened species a large threat to survival is disease. 
For example, the black-footed ferret is affected by canine distemper and sylvatic plague, 
among other diseases. The black-tailed prairie dog, the primary diet of the black-footed 
ferret is also susceptible to canine distemper. If infected by these diseases, an entire 
colony can be wiped out.88 For species of this type, which are sensitive to disease, the 
biological goal would include preserving several isolated populations as well as meeting 
a minimum population size or habitat core area. Management of several meta populations 
would be necessary to meet some minimum probability of survival because as the 
number of individual populations is reduced, the probability of an epidemic wiping out 
the species is increased. 
Another biological concern that need be addressed when planning and designing 
habitat reserves is preserving land that possess key habitat characteristics that the listed 
species need for survival. For example, the red cockaded woodpecker requires roughly 
100 acres of open pine stands for foraging and roosting. For foraging, pines need to be at 
least 30 years old, while roosting cavities are typically dug into older pines (over 60 
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years) that are infected by red-heart disease.
89
 A second example, the black-footed ferret 
primarily preys on prairie dogs, and requires habitat that provides for its dietary needs.
90
 
Each species has its own set of habitat and dietary needs, which must be considered in 
conjunction with the minimal size of the habitat reserve, when designing mechanisms for 
protecting species.       
An effective conservation strategy needs to address these biological needs, and in 
doing so should view the landscape as a whole. Targeting species-specific habitat 
requirements and coordinating landowner conservation efforts to create larger preserves, 
for most listed species, increases the species probability of survival. Coordinating 
conservation across landowners, so that two or more fragmented habitats of insufficient 
size are connected to make one large reserve, may also have the added benefit that in 
meeting the ESA objective of conserving imperiled species ―to the extent practicable‖, 
less total acres are required. By coordinating conservation into larger reserves, especially 
if the edge to core ratio is minimized, the minimum acceptable probability of survival for 
a listed species are met with fewer total acres than if conservation is fragmented. 
 Zoning, TDR, and conservation banks have a very high potential for targeting 
species-specific habitat needs and coordinating conservation into larger habitat reserves. 
The regulator, when employing either a zoning or TDR policy, restricts the land desired 
for conservation from being used for any purpose other than conservation. The regulator 
can target specific land and land attributes, which include the edge to core ratio of the 
habitat reserve.   
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Unlike the command and control approaches of zoning and TDR, conservation 
banking is effective at preserving specific land attributes and at creating one single large 
habitat reserve because the bank owner is presented with incentives to create the most 
effective conservation reserve. The number of credits the conservation bank owner can 
earn per acre is dependent on the quality of the habitat of the conservation bank, the rarity 
of the species, and the number of listed species that the bank can support. To maximize 
the number of credits available for sale, the bank owner has an incentive to create a 
conservation bank which meets the species specific needs best by creating one large 
contiguous habitat area, employing habitat management techniques like prescribed 
burnings, or by locating new conservation banks next to existing habitat.
91
   
Subsidies, fee simple acquisition, and PDR easements are all voluntary incentive 
mechanisms and as a result the regulators ability to target specific land for conservation is 
reduced. Some landowners may not want to participate in the program at any price, while 
other landowners may value their land at a higher price than the regulator is willing to 
pay. Landowners unwilling to participate may limit the effectiveness of these policy 
instruments at designing one large habitat reserve.   
The benefit of a subsidy program, though limited by the number of willing 
participants, is the program can be designed to protect specific attributes of the 
environment. In general, the process to participate in the program includes an application, 
conservation plan, and an initial and final inspection. For many subsidy programs, 
landowners are not paid until the final inspection has been conducted and approved, 
providing the government agency considerable project discretion and oversight. 
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Government agencies are able to choose the projects that satisfy some pre-designed 
evaluation process, and pick those projects that meet the goals of the program at least 
cost, examples being the two-stage technical evaluation process employed by the SRFB 
and the CRPs Environmental Benefits Index.
92
       
The regulator has the least control over the land set aside for habitat protection 
when a donated easement or impact fee policy is used. When an Impact fee policy is 
used, the land that remains undeveloped (or conserved) is the land with a development 
value less than the impact fee. It is unlikely that the conserved land is the land with the 
highest quality habitat or that the configuration of the habitat reserve would be such that 
edge effects are minimized. 
The problem with donated easements is that they only appeal to landowners that 
have a high conservation value because typically landowners are not fully compensated 
for the lost land productivity. Although it is possible that all landowners that find donated 
easements appealing live in the same area, and their properties border each other in a 
manner that creates the largest possible core, it is unlikely. The case more likely to occur 
with donated easements is that habitat reserves might remain fragmented. 
 
3.1.2. Permanency 
 Land worth conserving today because of the biodiversity benefits the land 
provides for a species protection is likely to be land worth preserving indefinitely. This 
concept holds if the regulator is seeking to meet the ESA objective at least cost—where 
the minimum acceptable probability of survival is just satisfied. A loss of a relatively 
small portion of the conserved land could send a delisted species back to an imperiled 
                                                 
92
 See FSAb supra note 42; see also SRFB 18 supra note 28.  
 44 
status. Three potential pitfalls for permanency in conservation are: 1) short term 
contracts, because successive negotiations may not be successful; 2) oversight and future 
land uses are subject to political whims; and 3) contracts are subject to conflict, future 
litigation, and possible reductions in conservation requirements.      
  A mechanism does best at avoiding conflict under three conditions: 1) when 
agreements are mutually beneficial to all participating parties; 2) when contracts are of 
shorter duration; and 3) the number of participating parties is kept relatively small. 
Intuitively, the smaller the number of participants involved in the agreement the more 
likely agreements are mutually beneficial. Furthermore, shorter contracts reduce the 
number of participating parties by decreasing the probability of land being transferred to 
another party.     
 The incentive mechanism best able to guarantee the land stays in conservation in 
perpetuity is conservation banking. Conservation banks, prior to approval by the 
regulator and the sell of the first bankable credit, are required to establish a conservator 
for the bank, fund the management and maintenance of the bank in perpetuity, and if the 
conservation bank falls short of its conservation goal, the banking instrument specifies 
the corrective actions that are to be taken.   
 PDR easements, donated easements, and TDRs with zoning are designed to 
conserve land in perpetuity but may be shrouded in uncertainty. A TDR with zoning may 
be susceptible to political pressure, especially if zoning is the only method to ensure 
development does not occur in sending zones. Since zoning is not a permanent feature of 
land, the zoned uses can change when political power changes. Some TDR programs 
require that landowners place a conservation easement on the title of the land, 
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permanently severing the rights to develop it.
93
   
Conservation easements are not a cure all, however. The easement contract 
specifies conservation requirements to be forever. But easements are susceptible to 
subsequent landowners scrutinizing the easement in search of loopholes by which to 
increase personal returns to the land. The agreements may have to be re-negotiated or the 
conservator may have to force the landowner to comply by taking legal actions. It is 
likely the landowners’ gain more flexibility in using their land and conservation 
commitments is reduced as a result. Over time conservation commitments may be 
reduced sufficiently to render the conservation commitment insufficient to achieve its 
initial goal, much the same as if the land had been developed completely. 
 Fee simple acquisition and zoning are less likely to conserve land permanently 
than easements. These two mechanisms ability to conserve land in perpetuity depends on 
whether the goals of the government remain constant across time. If the objectives of the 
government change and species protection becomes less important, the land could be 
reassigned to other uses or sold to fund other government projects. Fee simple acquisition 
and zoning are subject to lobbying by special interest groups, interests groups that may 
represent a relatively small portion of society. If the interest groups are successful in 
influencing the governments’ objectives, it is likely that the costs to society outweigh the 
benefits to the select few that the interest group represents.
94
 
 The least effective at preserving land in perpetuity is subsidies and impact fees. 
Impact fees because in and of themselves they do not restrict land to conservation, only 
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keep it from being developed. Subsidies because they are generally paid on an annual 
basis and landowners have the opportunity to develop their land without repercussion 
every year. Also, funding the subsidy may prove to be problematic. If the necessary 
funding is not available, landowners may revert to developing their land.   
 
3.1.3. Implement Active Habitat Management 
 The ESA prohibits landowners from undertaking activities that harm listed 
species either directly or indirectly through habitat modification. The ACT does not 
require landowners to improve the quality of the species habitat on their land. The ACT 
only serves to conserve habitat. But for many species, simply deterring productive uses of 
the land is not enough to ensure that a minimum acceptable probability of survival will be 
met. Species often require landowners to restore or create habitat, or implement active 
management practices, such as prescribed burnings, alien species control, reduced use of 
the land for grazing or reduced use of pesticides on the conserved land to maintain habitat 
suitable for the species recovery. For example, the leading threats to the California red-
legged frog are fragmentation of habitat, degradation of water quality, and the 
introduction of an alien species, the bullfrog. The recovery plan for the California red-
legged frog calls for the restoration and creation of habitat as well as controlling the 
threat posed by the bullfrog. A second example, the Black-capped Vireo requires an open 
brushy area of young small trees and shrubs for its habitat. In the absence of natural fires, 
landowners must maintain suitable habitat for the Black-capped Vireo through prescribed 
burnings. In a study of 305 listed species, better than sixty percent required active habitat 
management or habitat restoration.
95
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 Active habitat management techniques are incorporated in an incentive 
mechanism best when participation is voluntary, each contractual agreement can be 
negotiated independently, contracts are of short duration, and assurances are included in 
the agreement. Voluntary participation insures that the landowner is being fully 
compensated for the habitat management requirements set forth in the agreement. 
Negotiating contractual agreements allows the contract to be tailored to each individual 
landowner and to each specific species. Negotiations allow greater flexibility in designing 
an incentive package that satisfies both landowner and species-specific needs. Shorter 
contracts necessitate frequent renegotiations, which subsequently permit the provisions of 
the contract to be altered to meet changing landowner and species needs. Furthermore, 
the regulator can monitor the landowner’s compliance to previous agreements prior to 
negotiating new agreements. Assurances provide legal remedies in the event the 
landowner does not fulfill the agreement. Assurances can require the landowner to set-
aside funding sufficient to insure the long-term active management of habitat.  
The biggest deterrent to active habitat management is involuntary participation. 
Involuntary participation is the current approach to endangered species protection and 
does not provide landowners with any incentives to manage the habitat on their land in 
the species interest. In contrast, the landowner faces incentives to destroy the species and 
its habitat to avoid the costs of protecting species. The second deterrent is long-term 
contracts because the longer the elapsed time between the present and the initiation of the 
management agreement, the greater the likelihood that the landowner, or a subsequent 
landowner, violates the agreement in an attempt to increase economic rents. Active 
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habitat management is costly so landowner’s can increase their economic rents by 
violating the agreement.   
The mechanisms that have a very high potential for implementing active habitat 
management are subsidies, conservation banking, and fee simple acquisition. Subsidies 
are voluntary short-term contracts, which are typically negotiated between the landowner 
and the regulator. Subsidies can be tailored to a specific species and to each individual 
landowner. Because subsidies are short-term contracts, the regulator can ensure that the 
landowner has fulfilled the habitat management requirements prior to renewing the 
subsidy. 
Conservation Banks are also voluntary and negotiated on a case-by-case basis. 
The number of credits a conservation bank earns for resell depends partly upon the 
quality of the habitat.
96
 Conservation bank owner are required to maintain the habitat in 
perpetuity. To assure that the conservation bank owners fulfill the terms of their contract, 
the banking agreement requires financial assurances are set-aside to pay for the 
management of the habitat in perpetuity. Financial assurances can counter the negative 
effect of long-term contracts. 
A fee simple acquisition mechanism purchases the land outright placing 
ownership and responsibility of managing the land on the government. Implementing 
habitat management is straightforward and requires the appropriate government agency 
be notified of the management requirements.   
Easements, both PDR and donated, are voluntary long-term contracts negotiated 
between the landowner and the regulator. In evaluating the ability of the mechanism to 
implement active habitat management easements are similar to subsidies except that 
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easements are long-term contracts. Unlike conservation banking, easements do not have 
built in assurances to offset the negative effects of the long-term aspect of the incentive 
mechanism. Landowners receive payment in full at time of contract initiation, and must 
satisfy the terms of the agreement in perpetuity. Fulfillment of active habitat management 
required in the contract depends on the integrity of the landowner, the landowner’s 
conservation value, and the regulators monitoring and enforcement of the agreement. In 
any event, as time passes, active habitat management is likely to diminish as the 
encumbered land changes ownership, or the opportunity cost of habitat management 
increases, or as the regulator relaxes the monitoring and enforcement of agreements. 
TDRs, zoning and impact fees all have a very low ability to require landowners to 
undertake active habitat management because they force landowners to conserve their 
land involuntarily. Involuntary participation creates resentment and disincentives for 
landowners to undertake activities that enhance the habitat on their land. Zoning and 
impact fees both require landowners to conserve habitat without being compensated for 
lost productivity, any habitat improvements undertaken by the landowner increases his 
out-of-pocket expenses, costs the landowner is unlikely to incur.   
Landowners do receive some compensation with a TDR incentive mechanism, 
owners of land in the sending zone sell their TDRs to developers in the receiving zone, 
but the compensation is independent of the opportunity cost of the land. Improving the 
quality of the habitat only increase the landowner’s opportunity cost without effecting his 
compensation. A landowner incurs fewer opportunity costs by not undertaking active 
habitat management.          
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3.2. Landowner Interests 
 We consider three basic landowner concerns identified over the years in informal 
and formal discussions with ranchers, developers, and farmers. Landowners want their 
participation to be voluntary, they want their privacy maintained, and their stewardship 
toward the land recognized and acknowledged.   
 
3.2.1. Voluntary participation 
Designing mechanisms that allow landowners to voluntarily participate, rather 
than forcing landowners to participate through some type of command and control 
mechanism, alters the landowners’ incentives. When landowners are coerced into 
conserving their land to protect species and habitat without compensation, the landowners 
are faced with incentives to destroy the species and habitat prior to government 
regulation. Alternatively, if the landowner is compensated for habitat conservation, and 
the compensation is dependent on the quality of the habitat, then landowners are provided 
the incentive to conserve their land and to do so without force.       
 Zoning and TDR policies predetermine which land is to be conserved and then 
force those landowners into conserving their land. For these mechanisms, voluntary 
participation is almost non-existent.
97
 Fee simple acquisition can also be non-voluntary 
when the government uses its eminent domain to force the landowner to sell his or her 
land. Fee simple acquisition can also occur in situations in which the landowner 
voluntarily sells his or her land to the government agency or other conservator. 
When an impact fee policy is used, landowners who choose to develop their land 
are required to pay an impact fee. A landowner does have the choice to not pay the 
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impact fee, but that entails an opportunity cost of foregoing development of his or her 
land. Only landowners with a conservation value in excess of the opportunity cost of 
foregone development choose to conserve their land voluntarily.                     
 Regulatory policies of subsidies, conservation banking, and PDR and donated 
easements all have a very high rank as being voluntary for landowners. Landowners that 
create conservation banks do so voluntarily with the expectation of turning a profit.  
Subsidy programs typically require landowners to apply for the subsidy and to 
then satisfy specified criteria. The number of applications often exceeds the accepted 
conservation projects. If the incentives are not sufficient for the landowner, the 
landowner need not apply. PDR and donated easements require landowner and 
conservator to negotiate contracts, which specify the obligations and requirements of both 
the landowner and conservator. If the contract is not satisfactory to the landowner, the 
landowner can abort negotiations and not conserve his or her land. 
 
3.2.2. Privacy Maintained 
Most landowners in the United States want to preserve their right to exclude 
persons from trespassing on their land. Also landowners want to minimize the rights of a 
third party from legitimately, through contractual agreement or other arrangement, 
entering their land. Policies that do not alter or split the property rights to the land are 
more effective at maintaining privacy. When the property rights remain intact, confusion 
over who has what rights is avoided. Impact fees maintain the rights to privacy most 
effectively because upon payment of the impact fee compliance to the policy is satisfied 
for developed properties. For properties not developed, landowners maintain the right to 
exclude government regulators from entering their property. Zoning, like an impact fee 
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policy, also maintains a very high level of privacy. The landowner maintains all rights to 
the land and can restrict access to his or her land.   
 Conservation banking and TDR instruments for conserving habitat are highly 
effective at maintaining the landowner’s privacy. Both instruments allow the government 
regulator access to the land to monitor and enforce the contractual agreements. Access is 
typically specific. For subsidies, PDR easements, and donated easements the ability to 
maintain privacy is dependent on the negotiated contracts or the rules of the program. 
Some subsidy programs require the landowners to permit access to their land to the 
general public, although the landowner does have the ability to exclude specific 
individuals. With easements, the property rights are severed and split between the two 
parties. The landowners’ ability to protect their privacy hinges on the contractual 
agreement and may be low, medium, or high. When the government purchases land 
through fee simple acquisition, the land becomes the property of the public. The ability to 
deny the general public access to the land may be limited. 
 
3.2.3. Stewardship Recognized 
 Is the landowners’ effort to preserve or enhance the habitat on their land 
acknowledged? Acknowledgement can take many forms including public or financial 
awards, but must create an incentive for the landowner to preserve or enhance the habitat 
on their land. Conservation banking rewards bank owners for good stewardship by 
increasing the number of credits that the bank owner can sell to offset development. The 
bank owner enhances the property, increasing the quality of the habitat or the number of 
listed species, and as a result increases the number of credits that can be sold, which 
increases the revenue to the bank owner. Subsidies also reward stewardship, but less 
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effectively. The subsidy policy can entail that the landowner restore or create habitat or 
might only be a mechanism to keep the land from being developed.   
  PDR and donated easement contracts may or may not specify the landowner 
undertake habitat management techniques. If the contract specifies the landowner 
maintain the habitat on the land, the extent to which the landowner meets his or her 
contractual obligations likely depends on the conservator’s diligence in monitoring and 
enforcing the contract. Also, because the landowner receives full payment when the 
contract is negotiated, the conservator has no leverage to ensure the landowner holds up 
his or her end of the agreement. 
 Impact fees, zoning, and TDR policies do not provide landowners with any 
incentive to enhance and maintain the habitat on the land. In many cases the opposite 
holds true, to avoid being forced to conserve their land, the landowner may choose to 
destroy the habitat.
98
 Fee simple purchase is also very low at rewarding stewardship 
because the land is in public hands, and individuals may see the responsibility of 
maintaining the land as the government’s problem. 
 
3.3. Government Concerns 
 We consider five general categories of governmental concerns associated with 
implementing an incentive scheme—administrative costs, monitoring and enforcement 
costs, acquisition costs, information rents, and risk of habitat destruction.    
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3.3.1. Administrative Costs 
 Administrative costs are expenditures on the staff necessary to establish 
conservation plan, process applications, establish markets to facilitate trades between 
suppliers and demanders of tradable development rights and bankable credits, process 
and maintain records for property right transfers and land use restrictions, and staff and 
fund programs that maintain government owned conservation lands. Administrative costs 
increase as the needed staff, reporting requirements, and other various accounting needs 
increase.   
Administrative costs are lowest for the status quo—zoning. Zoning ordinances 
have been used to control the shape of growth for a century. The infrastructure necessary 
to administer a zoning conservation policy is already in place. Administrative costs for 
zoning ordinances increase as the government planning agency implement more flexible 
zoning policies. Two examples of flexible zoning include cluster zoning—dividing the 
land into a high density development cluster and an open space cluster; and performance 
zoning—a developer provides a certain level of conservation prior to approval of the 
development plan. Flexible programs usually increase the administration costs to the 
local government, and subject the developer to more governmental control due to the 
project-by-project review process.
99
 Impact fees, like zoning, have low administrative 
costs because the infrastructure necessary to implement an impact fee policy is already 
established.  
Fee simple acquisitions have low to medium administrative costs, which primarily 
results from the need to manage and maintain land once acquired. Government agencies 
responsible for managing these lands are largely intact, and only a minimal increase in 
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staff may be necessary. Like fee simple acquisition, donated easements also have low to 
medium administrative costs because the infrastructure necessary to oversee a donated 
easement policy is already in place. A large portion of the administrative responsibility 
for donated easements rests in the IRS, which has the economies of scale to deal with the 
responsibility of oversight of donated easements at a minimal or zero impact on staffing 
requirements. While donated easements must still be negotiated between the landowner 
and a conservator, the administrative costs to the regulator are small because the 
conservator can be an IRS approved nonprofit conservation organization. 
 Conservation banks are at the other end of the spectrum, exhibiting high 
administrative costs. Conservation banks require the regulator to staff the oversight of an 
extensive application process as well as establishing a market for and tracking the 
transfer of bankable credits. Also having high administrative costs are policies of PDR 
easements, subsidies, and TDR. For PDR easements, contract negotiations constitute the 
bulk of the administrative costs. The costs of contract negotiations are high because PDR 
easements result in the landowner and the regulator having joint ownership in the 
property. Some agreements on how to split the property rights may require complex and 
costly negotiations. 
 Subsidies policies also have high to very high administrative costs because 
subsidy programs typically require the landowner to submit an application and to satisfy 
specific requirements. The regulator incurs administrative costs to evaluate applications 
and to insure that the specified requirements are met. As the application and review 
process becomes more extensive, the more costly it is to administer the subsidy. By some 
estimates, administrative costs for subsidy mechanisms have been in the range of ten to 
 56 
thirty percent of every dollar spent.
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 For TDRs land is allocated for conservation 
through zoning. Administration costs center around the need to establish a market to 
facilitate trades and to record transfer of TDRs. Records must be kept to insure that once 
a landowner has traded (sold) away the development rights in the land, that the land is 
designated for conservation thereafter. If records are not maintained, the landowner could 
lobby for future zoning changes, and if successful develop his land.   
  
3.3.2. Monitoring and Enforcement Costs 
Monitoring costs are the costs that the regulator accrues in insuring that land use 
restrictions are not being violated and that contractual conservation agreements are being 
upheld. When violations of land use restrictions or contractual agreements occur, 
enforcement costs accrue in correcting the situation. Monitoring and enforcement 
obligations are perpetual and must be funded annually. 
Fee simple acquisition has low monitoring and enforcement costs. Inherent in the 
purchase of the land is the right to control acceptable land uses and the costs of 
monitoring and enforcement may be limited to preventing the public from misusing the 
land. Conservation banking has low to medium monitoring and enforcement costs. The 
costs to monitor and enforce agreements are low because the banking agreement 
stipulates reporting and monitoring criteria, establishes a bank manager, and specifies 
remedies for violations of the agreement. Conservation banks also combine many 
developers’ mitigation requirements reducing the number of mitigation projects requiring 
regulatory oversight and, because the sole purpose of a conservation bank is to earn 
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profits through the provision of conservation, bank owners are unlikely to undertake 
activities that diminish their potential profits.
101
   
 Incentive mechanisms that allow the landowner to remain on the land and retain 
complete or partial property rights have higher monitoring and enforcement costs. The 
magnitude of the costs to monitor and enforce conservation requirements is related to 
many factors including the time frame in which conservation payments are made to the 
landowner, the length of conservation agreements, and the landowners’ range of 
permissible land uses. Spreading landowner compensation payments over many periods 
rather than paying the landowner one lump sum payment, is likely to reduce the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing agreements. The landowner must prove compliance on regular 
time intervals to receive the periodical conservation payment. Likewise, the shorter the 
contract duration the lower are the monitoring and enforcement costs likely to be. 
Monitoring and enforcement costs tend to increase as the time that has lapsed between 
the present and the time of agreement initiation increases. Furthermore, with longer 
contracts the probability the land transfers ownership increases. As subsequent 
landowners take control of the land, the likelihood that conservation agreements will be 
upheld decreases, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing agreements increases. A 
larger set of permissible land uses can have either a positive or negative effect on the 
magnitude of monitoring and enforcement costs. On the positive side, as the landowners 
freedom to use her land increases the need to violate the agreement decreases. More 
acceptable land uses provides the landowner with more opportunities to intentionally or 
unintentionally misinterpret the agreement. Whether the positive or negative effect of 
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landowner freedom is of more significance is uncertain. Longer contracts that 
compensate landowners with a one-time lump sum payment, as is the case with both 
donated and PDR easements, tend to have larger costs to monitor and enforce 
agreements. To ensure its interests are being fulfilled, the conservator must regularly 
monitor the landowners’ actions. As ownership of the PDR land changes, monitoring and 
enforcement costs will likely increase.
102
 Subsidies, which are shorter length contracts 
with periodical (typically annual) payments, have lower monitoring and enforcement 
costs but still exceed the costs of conservation banking and fee simple acquisition. 
Involuntary incentive mechanisms also have high monitoring and enforcement 
costs. Involuntary incentive mechanisms, such as zoning, TDRs with zoning, and impact 
fees, force strict rules on landowners. Some restricted land uses that require government 
permits, like the construction of an office building or house, may be easily monitored. 
Other restricted land uses, such as cultivating crops or clear cutting trees, may require the 
regulator to engage in more active and costly monitoring and enforcement activity. 
For example, a TDR with zoning policy has high monitoring and enforcement 
costs. Land restricted from development must be monitored to ensure that landowners do 
not undertake prohibited activities; also developers must be monitored to ensure that the 
density of development does not exceed their permissible level, zoned plus TDRs. If 
landowners and developers undertake prohibited activities, the regulator must decide 
whether and to what degree she enforces the restrictions with the penalties specified by 
the law.   
  The main point is that both voluntary and involuntary incentive mechanisms that 
allow the landowner to stay on the land require the regulator to incur monitoring and 
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enforcement costs. Compensation paid in short term intervals is possibly the only method 
of reducing these costs.   
 
3.3.3. Acquisition Costs 
Acquisition costs are the actual cash outlays required to purchase or otherwise retire 
land for species protection. Land can be retired through purchase of either full or partial 
interest in the land, or by a payment that retires the land for a specified term.   
Both subsidies and fee simple acquisition have very high costs of retiring land for 
conservation purposes. Fee simple acquisition has very high costs, because acquiring land 
in its entirety, with all its rights in tact, is expensive and requires the greatest amount of 
financial resources initially.   
The acquisition costs associated with subsidies are less than the acquisition costs 
of fee simple acquisition in the short run. In the long run, however, subsidy acquisition 
costs may exceed those of fee simple acquisition. The primary reason for lower short run 
and higher long run acquisition costs are that subsidies generally only restrict land 
activities for a limited time period. The annual payment of the subsidy is less than the 
costs of purchasing the land fee simple. But if the land is continually conserved through 
subsidies, the sum of payments over time is likely to exceed the costs of purchasing the 
land outright. The increased cost for a subsidies mechanism is the price of flexibility. 
Subsidies provide more flexibility to both the government regulator and the landowner. 
At the fruition of the subsidy, both the regulator and the landowner can reevaluate their 
options and determine their best course of action for the next time period. The regulator 
may prefer a subsidy if limited funds makes it impossible to meet the ESA goal with 
other incentive mechanisms. The landowner may prefer more flexibility if she is 
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uncertain about future opportunities. Regardless of who prefers more flexibility, the costs 
to conserve the land in perpetuity using a subsidy incentive scheme is likely to be greater 
than the costs of fee simple acquisition.  
PDR easements require the regulator to incur acquisition costs. But the acquisition 
costs of PDR easements are less than for fee simple acquisition because the regulator is 
only purchasing partial interest in the land. PDR easement acquisition costs have been 
estimated to be in the range of 20 to 90 percent of the costs of fee simple acquisition.
103
 
Donated easements are funded through federal tax deductions, which mean that 
landowners’ typically receive less than the fair market value. Donated easements require 
less actual cash outlays than does PDR easements. The tax deduction represents a 
decrease in the federal government’s annual budget, funds that must be spread across all 
worthy projects. Funding a donated easement program reduces the funds available for all 
federal government programs. A local regulator, using a donated easement mechanism, 
can conserve land with minimal cash outlays.    
Zoning, TDRs with zoning, conservation banking, and impact fees all have 
relatively low acquisition costs. Under an impact fee scheme, a government funds the 
acquisition costs by requiring developers to pay a fee to offset the impact of their 
development. Likewise, TDR with zoning and conservation banking have conservation 
funded by developers through the purchase of development rights or bankable credits. 
Zoning forces the costs of conservation on the landowner, incurring acquisition costs in 
the rare event that a Fifth Amendment property taking has occurred.   
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3.3.4. Information Rents 
Information rents occur when landowners are paid more than their opportunity 
cost of the lost land simply because the landowner knows more about themselves than the 
regulator. Information rents are most prominent when the regulator is confined to 
conserving specific land parcels and required to use voluntary incentive mechanisms. 
Landowners can act strategically. The landowner, knowing that the regulator must 
acquire his land to satisfy the conservation objective, is able to extract from the regulator 
an extra payment that exceeds his or her actual opportunity cost. The landowner would 
have sold for less. When the landowner earns information rents, society pays too much 
for its conservation. The incentive mechanism can be perceived as inequitable from 
society’s point of view. 
For zoning, impact fees, conservation banking and TDRs with zoning information 
rents are very low or nonexistent. Information rents are absent for zoning and impact fees 
because landowners are not compensated for conserving land. With the latter two, 
conservation banking and TDRs with zoning, compensation is determined by the market. 
Landowners’ private information is reflected in the market price and information rents 
are eliminated.   
Of the four completely voluntary incentive mechanisms, donated easements have 
the smallest potential for information rents. Subsidies and fee simple acquisition have 
high to very high potential for information rents and PDR easements have a medium to 
high potential for information rents. The ability of landowners to earn information rents is 
dependent on the value of the compensation paid to the landowner and the ability of the 
landowner to act strategically in negotiating for compensation. Donated easements have 
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the lowest compensation and the rules regulating the use of donated easements are well 
defined reducing the possibility for the landowner to act strategically. Compensation 
under a PDR easement is greater than under a donated easement and because 
compensation is negotiated on a case-by-case basis, the opportunity for the landowner to 
strategically overstate his or her asking price is present. Like PDR easements, the fee 
simple acquisition incentive mechanism provides the landowner with the opportunity to 
act strategically. Unlike PDR easements, under a fee simple acquisition, because full 
interest rather than partial interest in the land is being purchased, landowners receive 
greater compensation. Because compensation is greater and the opportunity for strategic 
behavior is equal, information rents are greater.    
With a subsidy incentive mechanism, unlike the other three, contracts and 
payments are negotiated on a regular basis. Furthermore, the opportunity for strategic 
behavior is present for subsidies just as it is for PDR easements and fee simple 
acquisition. If subsidies are negotiated annually, the landowner has the opportunity to 
earn information rents every year.
104
 The accumulation of information rents over time 
could be substantial, and in present value may exceed the information rents of fee simple 
acquisition. 
 
3.3.5. Risk of Habitat Destruction     
When involuntary incentive mechanisms are used, government regulations 
impose uncompensated out-of-pocket expenses onto landowners. To avoid incurring the 
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regulatory costs of conserving their land, landowners are faced with the incentive of 
destroying the habitat on their land prior to regulation. Landowner destruction reduces 
the amount of land available for species preservation. The quality of land available for 
conservation could be affected if the landowner perceives that the probability of being 
regulated increases with land quality, which is likely the case.   
   Zoning has high DWL if landowners develop their land hastily to escape the high 
costs that a potential zoning rule would impose. Development that supersedes zoning on 
environmentally rich land can create a loss of conservation benefits. Landowners that are 
subject to TDRs with zoning may also face the incentive to prematurely develop their 
land. Because landowners zoned for conservation under a TDR with zoning incentive 
scheme are at the least partially compensated, the incentive to destroy land is less than 
that for zoning alone. The landowner destruction DWL associated with impact fees 
depends on if the magnitude of the impact fee is set on the habitat quality of the land. If 
the impact fee is set in conjunction with the conservation value, landowners have an 
incentive to destroy habitat to escape expensive impact fees.
105
 For voluntary incentive 
mechanisms landowners are fully compensated and the incentive to destroy habitat is low 
to very low. 
  
4. Concluding Remarks 
 We conclude by highlighting what we have learned from our review of the 
economic principles underlying the set of incentive mechanisms. First, market 
instruments
106
 that have been praised for the ability to control air pollution at minimum 
costs are not as effective for protecting habitat for two reasons. No uniform system of 
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measuring biodiversity exists; land has heterogeneous habitat quality and as a result 
market systems have to be combined with other regulatory tools like zoning to be 
effective. In addition, development results in permanent destruction of habitat, giving the 
regulator only one chance to get it right. Zoning would be effective on its own if political 
objectives, economic circumstances, and environmental preferences never changed, 
which is highly unlikely. 
Second, voluntary mechanisms, like fee simple purchase, easements, conservation 
banking, and subsidies are an effective and flexible method for targeting low cost land 
with high quality habitat. Extracting landowners’ private information, however, regarding 
both habitat quality and private use value is expensive and politically charged. Third, 
incentive mechanisms like conservation banking, subsidies, and easements can be 
designed to induce landowners to both conserve their land, and to invest in the 
conservation value of their land. This matters when habitat needs exceed the quantity of 
quality habitat and degraded habitat must be restored to meet the ESA objectives, or 
where creating or restoring a habitat corridor can expand habitat fragments. 
Fourth, establishing a method for measuring biodiversity, which takes an 
ecosystem approach, aids the cause of spreading minimum conservation dollars across 
the greatest number of species and habitat acres. By taking an ecosystem approach, rather 
than species-by-species, economies of scale can be realized since habitat can protect 
several species. A measure of biodiversity can bring people together to define and work 
toward meeting common ESA objectives. 
Fifth, conservation approaches, like conservation banking and TDRS, can be 
designed to satisfy both state and federal land use regulations. By bringing all the players 
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to the table, FWS (ESA), Corps (CWA), state fish and wildlife agencies, as well as other 
affected state, local and federal entities, the regulatory burden to both landowners and 
affected agencies can be reduced by giving the landowner regulatory certainty and the 
regulator access for monitoring land use restrictions and also clear cut recourse in the 
event the landowner fails to meet stipulated agreements. 
Sixth, mechanisms such as donated easements can reduce a regulator’s outlays 
by creating incentives for land trusts and other nonprofit organizations to work together 
and share the costs of conservation. Cost sharing works in both directions. Land trusts 
can reduce their costs by purchasing habitat fee simple, placing a conservation easement 
on the land that they hold, and then donating the land to the government to manage. 
Finally, no one incentive mechanism dominates. Factors such as development 
pressure, or the lack there of, funding, the range of land quality, quantity of suitable 
habitat, the range of land values, and types of landowners should be considered in 
determining which mechanism(s) would meet the regulators objectives most efficiently. 
When markets have many buyers and seller such that the developmental pressure 
in the region is strong, conservation banking is the preferred mechanism for species 
protection. Conservation banking consolidates the conservation requirements of many 
landowners and places them in the hands of one individual or organization, whose sole 
objective is to make money by providing conservation. Furthermore, because their profits 
depend on the quality of the conserved parcel, as well as minimizing the costs of 
conservation, conservation reserves will likely satisfy the biological criteria and reduce 
many of the long-term government costs.  
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 When markets have few buyers and sellers, no incentive mechanism stands out as 
the clear favorite. Each mechanism has its own strengths and weaknesses. If we assume 
that the government prefers a voluntary incentive mechanism over a command and 
control mechanism, then the field of potential policies is limited to easements, fee-simple 
acquisition, subsidies, or any combination thereof. In comparing the three on the basis of 
government costs it appears to be a wash. The landowner requirements are similar as 
well. Biological criteria have one important difference—the conservation reserves 
permanency. Subsidies are by far the least permanent, whereas easements have the 
potential for the greatest permanency. The problem with easements is that there is no 
guarantee—landowners may lack sufficient incentives to continue to uphold the contract 
in the future. A possible remedy to this situation would be to create a policy that 
combined easements (both PDR and donated) with subsidies. 
 The conservator could purchase the development rights in the land initially, and 
negotiate other land use restrictions. Some of these restrictions, in particular land 
management and maintenance requirements, could be tied into an annual subsidy 
negotiated periodically. The easement portion would provide permanence, while the 
subsidy would give the landowner and the conservator some flexibility. The number and 
types of landowners that this policy would appeal to would likely be more than each 
mechanism appealed to independently. The potential to create a larger preserve should 
increase as a result, and because landowners are being paid an additional annual subsidy, 
for which they can negotiate, the permanence of the conservation should be more secure.   
Considering government costs, monitoring and enforcement costs are likely to be 
smaller for the same reason that the conservation reserve is likely to be more permanent. 
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Acquisition costs are likely to increase, however, the cost of the easement initially may 
decrease because of the stream of subsidy payments that follow. Administration of the 
policy would maintain a similar approach as did a subsidy policy and costs continue to be 
very high. Information rents are higher, the landowner has two pieces of private 
information for which to extract rents—the personal value of the easement and the 
personal value of the annual subsidy.     
  
 
